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Throughout his work, John Dewey seeks to emancipate philosophical 
reflection from the influence of the classical tradition he traces back to 
Plato and Aristotle. For Dewey, this tradition rests upon a conception 
of knowledge based on the separation between theory and practice, 
which is incompatible with the structure of scientific inquiry. 
Philosophical work can make progress only if it is freed from its 
traditional heritage, i.e. only if it undergoes reconstruction. In this 
study I show that implicit appeals to the classical tradition shape 
prominent debates in philosophy of mathematics, and I initiate a 
project of reconstruction within this field.    
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1. Introduction 
 
n recent years, a renewed attention has been paid to John Dewey's 
logical works, notably LW12, as a significant resource for current 
philosophy of science1. It has been perceived that widely debated 
issues concerning realism or the truth of scientific theories can be 
fruitfully re-examined along the lines suggested by Dewey. It has not 
been so far suggested, however, that a systematic reconstruction of 
current philosophical debates on the basis of Dewey's logic is possible 
and desirable and that it will have to encompass philosophy of 
mathematics as well as philosophy of science.  
My goal in this study is to initiate a project of reconstruction 
in philosophy of mathematics by outlining its initial steps with respect 
to a class of contemporary debates. I offer an explication of the reason 
why the task of reconstruction is needed and worthwhile, as well as an 
indication of the manner in which it should proceed. In doing so, I 
hope to offer concrete proof of the effectiveness of Dewey's ideas 
when adopted critically to investigate specific issues in current 
philosophy. Although my discussion is largely self-contained, it is 
assumed to take place within the framework of LW122. 
 
2. The task of reconstruction 
 
John Dewey's motivation for reconstruction in philosophy stems from 
what he regards as a proliferation of puzzling questions within this 
discipline, whose distinctive feature is that they prove insoluble by the 
manner in which they have been set up. Reconstruction is called for 
because philosophical work has to be reorganised in such a way that it 
can escape artificial problems and, thus, irrelevance. In order for 
reconstruction to be possible, the source of artificial problems has to 
be identified.                                                          1 See in particular Brown (2012) and Godfrey-Smith (2002, 2010). 2 In particular, I work with the account of propositions offered in Chapter 15 of 
LW12 and with the account of mathematical discourse offered in Chapter 20 of the 
same text. 
I 
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Dewey traces the source back to a deeply ingrained 
contradiction pervading modern philosophical thought. The poles of 
this contradiction are an attachment to a traditional, pre-modern 
theory of knowledge as apprehension of ultimate, immutable Being on 
the one hand, and the acknowledgment of the significance of scientific 
inquiry on the other hand. A contradiction arises because, briefly put, 
modern scientific inquiry owes its effectiveness to a manner of 
acquiring knowledge that is at variance with the pre-modern 
conception. The latter, whose original, systematic expression Dewey 
finds in Plato and Aristotle3, requires drawing a sharp ontological 
divide between what is precarious and subject to change on the one 
hand, and what is absolutely invariable and exempt from modification 
on the other. Only the latter is recognised as the proper object of 
knowledge. To know is then to apprehend or assimilate an 
antecedently given reality that is ultimate and self-sufficient4. 
Knowledge so conceived issues only in the internal modification of 
the knowing agent5, leaving ultimate reality unchanged. It follows that 
the aim of knowledge is to get hold of the unblemished picture of 
immutable Being or to identify oneself with its synthetic unity. 
Ultimate reality can, in other words, be an object of aspiration and 
contemplative attention but not a partner in any transactions.   
By contrast, Dewey characterises modern scientific inquiry as 
a problem-solving activity that involves an enquirer and her 
surroundings in controlled processes of change. Its import is revealed 
by the consequences it can settle through the intelligent management 
of given existential conditions6. Scientific theories or propositions 
take part in this enterprise as instruments of intelligent management, 
as opposed to representations of fundamental realities or highest 
Being. The pre-modern conception of knowledge has little to do with 
this picture. Despite this, it has exercised a persisting influence on the 
manner in which philosophical reflection problematised the materials                                                         3 See e.g. MW12: 140-143 and LW4: 13. 4 As pointed out in e.g. LW4: 12. 5 See LW4: 17 and LW12: 161. 6 For Dewey's discussion of the structure of inquiry, see, in particular, Chapter 6 of 
LW12. 
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of scientific inquiry. Such influence has led to the construction of 
several artificial problems7.  
For instance, the centrality of the concepts of particle and 
force in XVII century natural philosophy could be interpreted, along 
pre-modern lines, as the discovery that reality is fundamentally a 
system of mechanical interactions between material bodies. Once 
materialistic metaphysics had pinned down the essential characters of 
reality, the presence of affectional and volitional objects in ordinary 
human dealings could be taken as a perplexing problem, capable of 
animating indefinitely protracted disputes8. The ensuing dialectic, 
disengaged as it was from the practice of specific, limited enquiries, 
could not satisfy any expectation for a definite outcome. 
Whenever philosophical reflection integrates a pre-modern 
conception of knowledge into the analysis of materials belonging to 
scientific inquiry, similar predicaments arise. Aspects of inquiry are 
exploited as cues to metaphysical conundrums that cannot be resolved, 
while they implicitly lead, among other things, to a dismissal of 
independent analytical efforts directed towards a better understanding 
of scientific practice and its liberation from metaphysical dogmatism. 
Dewey calls for reconstruction under these circumstances. His goal is 
to take leave of metaphysical disputes irrelevant to inquiry and replace 
this activity with the practice of inquiry itself. For this to be possible, 
a preliminary critical work is needed, which identifies the 
prepossessions animating existing philosophical debates and shows 
that their plausibility depends on neglect or misrepresentation of the 
context of inquiry itself.  
Prominent debates in philosophy of mathematics call for 
reconstruction in Dewey's sense, animated as they are by the pre-
modern conception of knowledge. This study is mainly devoted to 
showing that this is the case and to providing a definite orientation for 
reconstructive work. The critical analysis I articulate in the following 
sections can easily be applied to other topics in contemporary 
philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of science. 
                                                         7 See LW1: 107-114. 8 See LW4: 33 and LW1: 110. 
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3. The indispensability argument 
 
A matter of continued concern in contemporary philosophy of 
mathematics is the ontological status of mathematical entities. The 
possibility of developing this concern rests on the presumption that 
the references to entities such as numbers, lattices, graphs et cetera, as 
they are encountered in mathematical statements, have existential 
import. If this is the case, mathematical entities are to be conceived as 
entities that exist apart from ordinary experience: they are not items 
with which daily commerce is to be had under changing conditions, 
but eternal realities that cannot be located in the spatio-temporal 
continuum within which empirical change takes place. On this view, 
mathematical knowledge is the apprehension of immutable 
mathematical realities and, as such, it provides an ineffable connection 
between experience and transcendence. It is clear how profoundly the 
pre-modern conception of knowledge discussed in the previous 
section is in operation here.    
Philosophers who view mathematical propositions in the 
manner just described are mathematical realists or, as they are 
sometimes called, Platonists. A widely discussed attempt on the part 
of Platonists to establish the correctness of their position, upon which 
I shall focus, invokes the pervasiveness of mathematical propositions 
within scientific discourse as evidence for its central ontological claim.  
This kind of strategy is of special interest because it relies on 
the ancient conception of the object of knowledge as ultimate and 
immutable and seeks to reconcile this view with the results of 
scientific practice, whose significance it acknowledges as a matter of 
course. I argue that, if the latter acknowledgment is serious, the 
ancient conception must be abandoned, because it is untenable in the 
light of scientific practice. With it must also go the speculative effort 
proposed by the Platonist as worthy of being pursued.  
Platonists make the application of mathematics in empirical 
science serve their cause by locating its significance in the context of a 
particular argument, usually traced back to the writings of Quine and 
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Putnam9, and known as the indispensability argument. Its canonical 
formulation10 (a variant will be examined in the next section) runs as 
follows: 
 
(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the 
entities that are indispensable to our current best scientific theories. 
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories. 
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical 
entities. 
 
The most important statement in this argument is (P2), since it 
mentions mathematical entities, whose existence the Platonist intends 
to prove, as well as their ineliminable role within scientific theories. A 
trivial, but necessary, remark is that mathematical propositions, rather 
than entities, figure in scientific theories. Thus, at best, references to 
mathematical entities or, more precisely, mathematical terms, may be 
indispensable. Although this looks like a statement of fact, it raises a 
crucial issue, which goes unnoticed if no attention is paid to the 
scientific enterprise as a form of inquiry, i.e. as an activity aiming at 
the resolution of problematic situations. If mathematical subject-
matter is to play any useful role within inquiry, then it must serve the 
purpose of attacking problematic situations and supporting their 
resolution or reorganisation.  
Once this is acknowledged, it is legitimate to ask how 
mathematical subject-matter can guide intervention on specific 
empirical problems. It appears at least doubtful that it should do so by 
a sudden shift of attention from the terms of the problem at hand, 
which are empirical, to an altogether unrelated ontological realm, in 
which the eternal relations of non-empirical entities are crystallised. 
To invoke the structural resemblance between these non-empirical 
entities and empirical ones in order to legitimise an appeal to the latter 
would be, on the one hand, to identify the stability of experimental 
control or methodical action with a feature of fleeting events and, on                                                         9 Among others, Quine (1976, 1980) and Putnam (1971). 10 It is taken from Colyvan (2011), 49.  
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the other hand, to render the ontological appeal to extra-natural 
entities superfluous, if the patterns they display do have empirical 
realisations directly amenable to study11.  
Thus, to accept (P2), given a cursory look at the structure of 
inquiry is, at the very least, to adopt a conception of the successful 
application of mathematics that turns it into a miraculous 
occurrence12, as opposed to the fruit of deliberate and focussed 
reflection. It is nothing short of miraculous that mathematics should 
be effective insofar as it conveys no information upon the terms of the 
problems it is invoked to resolve. It is more plausible to think that its 
effectiveness depends on what it can do as an instrument capable of 
managing information for the sake of definite purpose: this type of 
function does not call for a supernatural reality supporting its 
performance.   
The last conclusion is strengthened by any explicit analysis of 
the functions performed by mathematical resources within scientific 
inquiry. Without going into detailed illustrations, it is possible to 
show why by means of a few remarks and a couple of brief examples. 
Intelligent conduct within inquiry demands deferring overt action in 
favour of strategic planning: for this to be possible, symbols have to be 
introduced, since it becomes necessary to talk about envisaged 
occurrences and future ways of acting, as opposed to handling given 
existences at once. Thus, within inquiry, the terms of a problem have 
to be symbolised and, once symbolised, they may be subjected to a 
formal treatment oriented towards the resolution of the problem 
itself.  
It is then possible to regard references to mathematical entities 
as modes of treatment of the terms of a problem, i.e. ways of putting 
available evidential materials into a form amenable to particular trains 
of thought governed by mathematical propositions. For example, to 
assign a street network a directed graph, in the context of an 
application of mathematics, is to declare how streets (seen as directed                                                         11 It is noteworthy that Field (1980) makes use of the correspondence between 
mathematical and empirical structures to mount an argument against Platonism. 12 Platonists have not hesitated to take it in this way: see in particular Colyvan 
(2001). 
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edges or, if two-way, pairs of directed edges) and their crossings (seen 
as vertices) are going to be reasoned about13. Similarly, to assign a 3-
simplex to an election involving three candidates14 is to declare how 
voter preferences can be studied and classified. Examples could be 
multiplied at will. Items like graphs and simplices are not, in applied 
capacity, nouns, but adverbs: they describe selected modes of 
operation, not entities foreign to the problematic situation under 
study15.  
When this conception of terms occurring in mathematical 
propositions involved in scientific applications is available, (P2) loses 
its force. What this premiss can now convey is that, at most, 
mathematical terms prove strategically crucial in problem-solving 
because they select modes of operation that are used to develop in 
reasoning the terms of the problem at hand. Ontological 
considerations are not relevant to this process. To defend their 
relevance is to defend the supernatural where only natural processes 
are at play.  
In view of this discussion, (P1) appears to be a hasty statement. 
There is no obligation to attach an ontological commitment to any 
term whatsoever that happens to enter the formulation of a scientific 
theory before carrying out a study of the particular functions 
performed by kinds of terms in inquiry. The latter study should be the 
primary goal of philosophical reflection, since the indispensability 
argument is of highly uncertain force before that study is carried out: 
it remains undecided what force its premisses exactly carry and 
whether or not they are pointing to an interesting problem. In view 
of the foregoing discussion, which is an immediate articulation of 
Dewey's ideas, it is clear that the premisses in question may seem 
compelling because no sufficiently thorough study of the application 
of mathematics as a complex of functions supporting enquiries is                                                         13 This is done in models of municipal street-sweeping. See e.g. Tucker and Bodin 
(1976). 14 The geometric treatment of voting alluded to is due to Donald Saari and 
developed e.g. in Saari (1995). 15 Note in this connection Dewey's remark that the referents of abstract terms are 
modes of operating, in LW12: 350. 
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available. In reconstructed philosophy of mathematics, this task takes 
centre stage, if only as a preliminary to making well-founded 
assertions about the employment of mathematical resources within 
scientific practice. 
 
4. The enhanced indispensability argument 
 
The main purpose of the foregoing discussion was twofold. On the 
one hand, it aimed at detecting, with respect to a philosophical topic 
of current interest, fragments of the conception of knowledge and of 
the object of knowledge that prompted Dewey's call to reconstruction 
in philosophy. On the other hand, it aimed at showing that, since this 
conception of knowledge can be enforced only if the context of inquiry 
and its purpose are held in abeyance, a reinstatement of the latter 
context suffices to motivate and to direct reconstruction. Thus, the 
philosophical content at variance with the structure of inquiry is set 
aside in favour of a philosophical task directly connected with the 
structure of inquiry.  
In the illustration of this process offered in section 3, I 
attempted to show that the canonical indispensability argument in 
philosophy of mathematics presumes for mathematical statements 
employed in scientific inquiry a position that must be in sharp conflict 
with the role they actually play in it. When this role is clarified, the 
initial presumption can no longer be upheld. A discussion of the 
indispensability argument is to be replaced by a study of the functions 
performed by mathematical resources within inquiry. 
This outcome seems to have been partially perceived by the 
proponents of indispensability arguments. In particular, Alan Baker 
framed what has come to be known as an enhanced indispensability 
argument16, motivated by a recognition that not every occurrence of 
mathematical terms in discourse relevant to scientific enquiries may 
carry an ontological commitment to transcendent mathematical 
realities17. The modification of the indispensability argument                                                         16 See e.g. Saatsi (2011). 17 Baker (2005), 224. 
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demanded by this recognition goes in the direction of a search for 
substantive employment of mathematical resources in scientific 
practice. Substantive, however, simply means 'unambiguously 
carrying ontological commitment'.  
It is conjectured that, when mathematical resources are used 
in an explanatory capacity, substantive commitment should be 
guaranteed. Since, however, explanatory capacity does not, on its 
own, provide an automatic or dependable lead to ontological 
commitment, the search for `genuinely' mathematical explanations18, 
as opposed to spurious ones, is in question. In this context, 'genuine' 
means, again, an 'unambiguously carrying ontological commitment'. 
Thus, if one replaces 'scientific theory' with 'genuine explanation' in 
the indispensability argument from section 3, one obtains an 
enhanced indispensability argument.  
The discussion from section 2 suffices to show that enhanced 
indispensability arguments trigger an indefinite search for something 
that cannot be found, as long as one remains within the compass of 
ordinary scientific research, as opposed to the reaches of mystical 
contemplation. Insofar as the goal of indispensability arguments is to 
identify ontological commitment, it fundamentally differs from the 
goal of inquiry, which is to adopt certain symbolic instruments in 
order to resolve problematic situations. The idea that such 
instruments should promote an effective way of handling the terms of 
a problem precisely because they refer to something alien to it is not 
directly entertained by Platonists. What Platonists defend is the 
thought that mathematical resources prove effective and that there is 
no better way of interpreting mathematical statements than one 
taking them as pointers to supernatural realities. From the point of 
view of reconstruction, the latter statement does not expound a view 
but highlight a conflict. It is the conflict between the pre-modern view 
of the object of mathematical knowledge as an unchanging, self-
contained reality, and the modern recognition that mathematical 
resources are extensively used to advance empirical investigations and 
thus function cooperatively within specialised activities wholly 
included in the natural world.                                                         18 Baker (2005), 233-236. 
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The proponents of enhanced indispensability arguments have 
not acknowledged the presence of this conflict because it has seemed 
to them clear that certain traits of mathematical treatment, notably 
abstractness and generality, cannot be ascribed to empirical 
particulars. The seemingly natural conclusion is that they must be 
features of abstract, mathematical objects. It is for instance argued19 
that mathematical objects ensure scope generality, in the sense that 
they identify patterns to which a variety of empirical instances 
conform, as well as topic generality, in the sense that the same 
mathematical entity (say, a graph-theoretical structure) can be applied 
to disparate situations.  
These features are not distinctive of the application of 
mathematics and they are not to be ascribed to entities. For instance, 
an evacuation procedure is scope general in the sense that it identifies 
a pattern of interactions transferrable to distinct venues of a similar 
kind. Physical exercise is topic general in the sense that it applies to 
disparate goals, medical, agonistic or spiritual. If generality is to be of 
any use, it cannot pertain to entities but to activities and procedures. 
Reasoning itself may be one such procedure and mathematical 
reasoning one special form thereof. The generality of mathematical 
reasoning becomes the trait of an entity only when the fact that certain 
interactions can be liberated from particular occurrences and 
formulated as procedures involving generic conditions is hypostatised 
into the quality of an ultimate object that cannot pertain to any 
particular object encountered in experience. 
When the adoption of mathematical means is not understood 
as an activity within inquiry but as a self-contained appeal to eternal 
truths, generality may at first look as if it could be conceived as a 
quality of mathematical entities foreign to empirical problems. If, 
however, it can be so conceived, it immediately becomes a source of 
perplexity, since it is disconnected from the more precarious pursuit 
it was intended to support. It must be brought to bear on it and there 
is no a priori reason safely to rest in the conviction that this can be 
done by clinging to an ontology that does not offer any possibility of 
interaction with empirical traits. Reconstruction begins with noting                                                         19 Baker (2017), 200-201. 
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that, within the dynamics of enquiry, features peculiar to extra-natural 
mathematical entities cannot prove helpful in practical situations 
thanks to their thorough irrelevance to them. Conjectures about such 
inexplicably effective entities are put aside in favour of a more 
straightforward examination of the place occupied by mathematical 
propositions within problem-solving activities. 
Even though enhanced indispensability arguments encourage 
the hypostatisation of strategies within inquiry as traits of objects 
foreign to all empirical inquiry, which reconstruction must undo, they 
have the merit of pointing to more clearly defined goals for 
reconstruction than canonical indispensability could do. These goals 
are the analysis of generality, abstraction and explanatory function in 
mathematised empirical inquiry. 
The manner in which the latter goals are to be pursued can, to 
some extent, be determined contrastively, i.e., by looking at the way 
in which they are pursued under the controlling influence of a pre-
modern conception of knowledge. Whenever philosophical work 
evinces attachment to such conception, it does not merely provide a 
misleading suggestion. As soon as it is compared against the context 
of inquiry, it also offers useful indications as to what information 
concerning the conduct of scientific practice was omitted or 
misrepresented and needs to be reinstated or faithfully portrayed. The 
act of reinstatement or rectification does not coincide with a simple 
dismissal of the earlier philosophical effort but with a more effective 
reorganisation of this effort that can shed greater light on the structure 
of its object, namely scientific practice.   
By contrast, to neglect the task of reconstruction where it 
should be engaged in, is to cloud what would have been a sharper 
picture of scientific practice with ideas ill-suited to it. Such undesirable 
outcome is not merely achieved by forgetting about the context of 
inquiry and deploying an old-fashioned ideal of knowledge in its place, 
but also by selecting certain features of inquiry, which are later 
hypostatised and treated as metaphysical entities or metaphysical 
truths.  
This kind of proceeding is instructively exemplified by some 
recent work concerning mathematical explanation, intended to 
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characterise it independently of any preoccupations with 
indispensability. The characterisation of interest has been proposed by 
Marc Lange20. Its critical discussion is the subject of the next section.  
 
5. Distinctively mathematical explanation 
  
Marc Lange's recent account of mathematical explanation 
presupposes a hierarchy of laws exhibiting various levels of 
necessitating strength. Within this hierarchy, mathematical necessity 
exercises a stronger constraint on a phenomenon to which it applies 
than, in particular, physical necessity does21. 
The view defended by Marc Lange is that explanation has a 
distinctively mathematical character when it describes a configuration 
of empirical traits as the result of sufficiently strong, real necessitation. 
In the next subsection, I shall show that this view is arrived at by 
committing what may be called the fallacy of selective emphasis. This 
is the hypostatisation of a distinct element or moment of inquiry, 
which is first isolated as significant and then identified with ultimate 
reality22. In subsection 5.2 I shall provide further elaboration on the 
particular manner in which Lange commits the fallacy and offer a few 
remarks on the ensuing misrepresentation of scientific practice.   
 
5.1. Explanation and inquiry 
 
In order to provide instances of mathematical explanation, Lange 
must isolate certain resolved situations, with their terms identified 
and their import known, i.e. their consequences settled. Under these 
conditions, an explanatory demand is the request of a rationale for the 
consequences so settled. Lange provides more or less sophisticated 
examples: since the exact same ideas apply to all of them, it will suffice 
to discuss only the simplest one23. A mother seeks evenly to distribute                                                         20 In Lange (2013, 2016). 21 See Lange (2013), 505 and Lange (2016), 31. 22 For a discussion of selective emphasis, see LW1:31-32.  23 Lange (2013), 495 and Lange (2016), 19. 
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twenty-three strawberries among her three children. She then realises 
that twenty-three is not a multiple of three. This is regarded as a 
distinctively mathematical explanation of failure to allocate the fruit 
in the desired manner. On Lange's view, divisibility absolutely 
constrains the allocation of discrete units. It is in force as a constraint 
even if one could envisage a scenario where physical laws had been 
altered.   
The significance of constraint, as well as its mathematical 
connotation, are not in question. Lange is certainly correct to 
emphasise them. He runs into troubles by interpreting them along 
metaphysical lines. To clarify this point and to identify the specific 
problem that affects Lange's account, some close analysis of his 
proposed example is required.  
The mother of three, whose plight Lange discusses, faces the 
problem of distributing some strawberries among her children. She 
needs to tackle this problem intelligently. The fact that twenty-three 
strawberries cannot be evenly divided, when regarded as units, both 
restricts her allocation strategies and directs her towards a viable one. 
The appeal to divisibility is for her an immediate development of 
evidential materials in a form more suitable to the resolution of a 
problem that presently matters to her. This is because the mother's 
initial observation, spelled out in terms of divisibility, identifies a 
hinderance only subject to a particular way of singling out the terms 
of the problem: if strawberries are the units of allocation, then even 
allocation is not possible. 
A proposition about divisibility here is a way clarifying what 
the successful lines of action are, by pointing out what action will be 
unsuccessful and by suggesting that success may be achieved by 
choosing the terms of the problem in such a way that divisibility no 
longer matters. The import of an appeal to divisibility is the partial 
result that, for allocation to be even, either strawberries are not to be 
regarded as units (slices might) or more of them should be bought, or 
fewer allocated or, finally, the arithmetical notion of even divisibility 
discarded. Since the controlling practical concern is with fair 
allocation, the same amount of strawberries measured in grams might 
be the objective of allocation. In this case, the three children may 
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possibly receive the same amount of strawberries, but different 
numbers of them.  
Such pedantic analysis has been gone through simply to 
emphasise, as forcefully as possible, that the significant content of the 
basic mathematical considerations in which the mother of Lange's 
example engages, i.e. the content that is consequential to her pursuit, 
is a discrimination of alternative courses of action. Discrimination 
includes the possibility of modifying the terms of the problem. Their 
initial, tentative position, under which strawberries, as opposed to e.g. 
slices thereof, were units of allocation, allows progress in problem 
resolution by pointing to an obstruction and calling for further 
reflection. The fact that, when strawberries are conceived as units and 
even allocation as allocation of these units in equal number, something 
cannot be done with them, is just a way of spelling out the relevance 
of the conceptions initially entertained to the problematic situation at 
hand.  
Strawberries are tentatively treated as units and it emerges 
that something cannot be done with them if they are so treated. This 
impossibility is an obstacle within an envisaged or attempted 
transaction. It is not surprising, but crucial to bear in mind, that 
transactions – because they are not delusional episodes in which desire 
attains complete fulfilment without resistance – involve effort, 
frustration and suffering. These features of transactions, as they occur 
within inquiry, can be meaningfully isolated. Mathematical 
instruments may facilitate their isolation, as in the example just 
discussed.  
When, however, this straightforward fact of inquiry is singled 
out and hypostatised into a metaphysical reality, i.e. law-like 
necessitation, the fallacy of selective emphasis is committed. Absolute 
reality takes the place of a salient trait of experience.  
The concrete basis of Lange's account is the fact that the 
constraints encountered as inquiry progresses are adversities or 
advantages emerging in the course of purposeful interaction. They are 
recognised and dealt with as obstructions and opportunities that 
present themselves in a given pursuit.  Mathematical instruments that 
figure in applications are designed or adapted to support any such 
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pursuit by highlighting adversities and developing advantages into 
strategies of action. If they were powerless to do so, they would be of 
no use in scientific inquiry and, consequently, never taken up or 
overhauled.   
To transform the above set of ordinary features of inquiry into 
evidence for the existence of metaphysical necessities, is effectively to 
dismiss inquiry as a source of knowledge and reinstate in its place an 
anachronistic conception of knowledge as the apprehension of a 
fundamental, unchanging reality constituted by eternal laws holding 
the cosmos together. What is a feature of inquiry is thus transformed 
into an absolute feature of reality that must escape inquiry, since 
eternal and universal laws, unlike manageable interactions between 
particulars, are never to be encountered in experience. 
Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation 
requires that the latter transformation be effected. Various 
undesirable consequences follow: one of them consists in the deletion 
of the role of laws as instrumentalities allowing the resolution of gross 
qualitative events for the sake of tighter control24. Focus on laws as 
the ultimate bounds locking Nature into an immutable order excludes 
a more productive focus on the function of laws in inquiry. The latter 
is contrastively singled out as the objective of philosophical 
reconstruction. The particular way in which it is forgotten against the 
background of Lange's account is the subject of the next subsection.   
 
5.2. Laws and necessity 
 
Lange's conception is not only erected on the fallacy of selective 
emphasis, but on an iteration thereof. In its first stage, the application 
of selective emphasis in Lange's study of explanation isolates 
obstructions or advantages within inquiry and identifies them with 
signs of necessitating constraints or laws. In the iterated stage, the 
distinctive methods (mathematical or non-mathematical) whereby 
obstructions and advantages may be detected are isolated and 
hypostatised as distinct orders of laws.                                                         24 Cf. LW12: 449. 
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This is why Lange can work with a hierarchy of stronger and 
stronger necessitation, where mathematical necessity is in particular 
stronger than physical necessity. Behind the distinction one may easily 
discover features of enquiries concerning mathematical or physical 
subject matter that undergo a process of hypostatisation.   
To clarify the point, consider a concrete example of inquiry 
from mathematical logic, revolving around the question about which 
subsets of the real numbers endowed with addition and multiplication 
are first-order definable. The question confronts an investigator with 
an indeterminate situation, whose full resolution will issue in a 
specific characterisation of the relevant subsets25. It is clear that the 
conceptions leading to the construction of the indeterminate situation 
given at the start of inquiry, e.g. the notion of a real number or the 
logical notions of a first-order language and of definability, are the 
results of previous enquiries, which have arisen and developed 
independently of physical subject-matter. In Dewey's terminology, 
such enquiries proceed independently of existential content26. They 
take as initial materials the objects of earlier reflection into 
relationships between formal languages and models. The latter are 
given only in the sense that they result from trains of thought that can 
be developed out of an axiomatic system (e.g. the theory of sets ZFC, 
conceived of as the axiomatised semantic meta-theory in use), not in 
the sense in which the components of an experimental setup are given. 
In a situation of this type, no treatment of a model-theoretical 
problem needs to attract the contents of physical subject-matter in 
order to be carried to a close. 
What the last remarks highlight is that the independence of 
mathematical results from physical considerations is a consequence of 
the disjoint trajectories followed by the way actual investigations have 
been set up27. To think of independence as the fact that certain eternal 
mathematical truths about definable subsets of the reals would                                                         25 A set is first-order definable in the given structure if, and only if, it is a union of 
intervals with algebraic endpoints. 26 See e.g. LW12: 392. 27 Obviously, this is not to say that they cannot be integrated at a later stage, in the 
face of a distinctive, new problematic situation. 
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continue to hold even where physical truths differed from those 
familiar at present is to misrepresent the matter. Misrepresentation is 
achieved through the metaphysical hypostatisation of one selected 
feature of actual, distinct enquiries, namely, the fact that, along their 
career, they do not need to rely upon one another. This simple fact is 
metaphysically sanctified when it is transformed into the assertion 
that mathematical necessity is stronger than physical necessity.  
Because the latter assertion is the cornerstone of Lange's 
analysis of distinctively mathematical explanations, it follows that its 
endorsement makes any attempt at understanding the role played by 
laws within scientific inquiry more arduous, by involving it into 
undesirable metaphysical detours, each of which replaces the career of 
investigation with absolute features of Nature.  
This criticism cannot only be voiced from the standpoint of 
Dewey's logical work28 but it is also implicit in much later 
philosophical work on natural laws. A notable example is provided by 
the writings of Nancy Cartwright, who extensively emphasises the 
intimate connection between the notion of physical law and the tight 
delimitation of an experimental setup shielded from external 
interferences29. When Cartwright's analysis is read from the 
standpoint of LW12, its most important result is that the very 
conception of a law arises within inquiry and cannot be ascribed to a 
universal regularity that is observable or significant apart from 
deliberate efforts aimed at experimental control and from technical 
restrictions of empirical possibilities. To revive a notion of law as a 
universal constraint that is actualised under a variety of contingent 
conditions, as Lange seeks to do, is to dismiss the structure of inquiry 
as an object of philosophical reflection in order to replace it with a 
conception that, being in essence pre-modern, is also pre-scientific. 
 
6. Prospects 
 
Work in philosophy of mathematics is often profound and insightful.                                                         28 Especially Chapter 22 of LW12. 29 In this connection, see especially Chapter 3 of Cartwright (1983). 
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The critical remarks proposed here are intended to suggest that its 
level of depth and insight can easily increase where metaphysical 
presuppositions incompatible with the structure of inquiry are in 
operation. This is the sign that a reconstructive task is needed, as a 
result of which greater insights may be obtained and hinderances to 
understanding may be removed. 
Reconstructive activity, as pointed out in this paper, is 
especially needed in connection with philosophical work dealing with 
the application of mathematics. Its first order of business is to replace 
debates concerning the ontological import of mathematical 
propositions with an analysis of their functions within the context of 
scientific enquiries.  
Although the required analysis cannot be fully carried out 
here, it seems appropriate to describe its general orientation. Because 
the goal of any inquiry is the resolution of an indeterminate situation, 
culminating in overt action aimed at modifying initially given 
existential conditions, the functions of mathematical resources are to 
be understood in relation to this goal.  
Apart from their specific characterisation, these functions play 
an intermediate role, in the sense that they are performed once a 
situation has been problematised and its terms can be put into a 
specific symbolic form amenable to mathematical treatment, which is 
in turn guided by mathematical propositions. The results of 
mathematical treatment are also intermediate, since they  lead to the 
formulation of plans of action that either trigger further development 
of symbolic form or prelude to intervention.  
This picture is very rough but it sets the task of discerning the 
functions of mathematical treatment in the course of inquiry. Once 
this is done, mathematical resources can be looked at as 
instrumentalities aiding problem-solving, as opposed to descriptions 
of ultimate traits of self-sufficient realities. When viewed as such 
descriptions, or attempted descriptions, they institute a separation 
between formal models and their targets, with the attending problem 
of deciding what kind of bridge may be invoked to make models 
relevant. Moreover, descriptions that do not match the respective 
targets, e.g. on account of idealisations, appear as imperfect, false or 
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distorted pictures thereof. The artificial puzzle arises of accounting for 
the usefulness or effectiveness of models that are cut off from their 
targets and in addition misrepresent them.  
If, on the contrary, following a reconstructive approach, 
mathematical ideas come to be studied as instruments of symbolic 
intervention that help develop the terms of a problem into a 
resolution thereof, the generic notion of a formal model is to be 
replaced by the distinct notion of a complex of functions or a site of 
symbolic interventions that advance problem-solving. The problem 
of the relation between a mathematical model and what it seeks to 
describe is replaced by the analysis of the manner in which 
mathematical techniques promote interaction with an indeterminate 
situation.  
 The puzzle of useful yet hopelessly inaccurate descriptions of 
phenomena is replaced by the analysis of idealisations or other 
assumptions as strategies employed to open a line of attack on 
particular problems. The effectiveness and insufficiencies of these 
plans are evidently a matter of philosophical interest.  
It is to be expected that paying a closer attention to scientific 
inquiry, as implied in the execution of a reconstructive task, should 
eliminate a number of puzzles in favour of a more lucid and more 
nuanced account of scientific practice, which can serve the purpose of 
providing the working scientists themselves with a sharper and more 
serviceable understanding of their activities and goals. This is a task of 
some importance, because it helps prevent the dogmatic habit of 
thinking  promoted by the uncontrolled, because unsuspected, 
influence of philosophical prepossessions from the past on present 
common sense.   
 It was perceptively remarked by Dewey that many 
philosophical ideas of the past survive as “the presupposed 
background, the unexpressed premises, the working (and therefore 
controlling) tools of thought and action”
30: it is a worthwhile task of 
philosophical critique to recognise their persistence and encourage 
progress beyond them. 
                                                          30 EW 4: 62. 
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